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A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority
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The Peace Accords:
Implications for the Future of Guatemala
HUGHBYRNE

O

n December 29, 1996, the Guatemalan government and leaders of the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) guerrilla front signed the
final peace agreement to end the country' s
36-year war. The war in Guatemala, though
less visible to the international community
than those in neighboring El Salvador and
Nicaragua, was enormously costly in terms
of lives lost and human suffering.
The peace accords are an extremely important moment in Guatemala' s history representing a passage from the nightmare of
the last four decades to at least the hope of
a better future. The accords are far from
perfect, particularly in their limitations on
telling the whole truth about the country's
bitter recent history and in the inadequacy
of their provisions to address the deep inequalities of Guatemalan society. But they
represent an important move away from the
country' s history of exclusion, discrimination, and impunity. The accords also provide the political space within which the
growing network of peasant, indigenous,
labor, and women's groups, and human
rights and other organizations can press
for political and social change.
From a population of 10 million, more
than 100,000 people were killed, 40,000 were
"disappeared," up to a million were forced
from their homes, and over 400 villages were
razed to the ground. In the worst period of
the war in the early 1980s, thousands of
Vol. 6, #1

men, women, and children
were murdered by the
Guatemalan armed forces
and paramilitary groups
in wholesale massacres.
Views of the Accords
The peace agreement
to end the war is a result
of the two main protagonists in the conflict realizing that, despite their differences, they shared mutual interests in ending the
conflict. The URNG front
realized that there was no
prospect of defeating the
government through
armed force and that its
best hope for development lay in open political
competition following a
peace accord. The Guatemalan government, particularly the current administration of Alvaro A member of CONAVIGUA, an organization of indigenous
Arzu , accepted that its Guatemalan women widowed due to war and poverty, works
in a cornfield in northern Guatemala. Photo by Ellen Shub
strategy of economic
agreements, can be looked at in three ways
growth fueled by foreign investment and
at the same time. They are, first, a great
aid would only be possible if the country
achievement since they provide a framewas at peace. Each party had something to
bargain with, but there was not equality in
work or blueprint for peace and social reform in Guatemala- these agreements, with
the negotiating positions- and this is eviall their limitations, provide Guatemalans
dent in the final peace agreement.
with their best opportunity for changing
The final peace accords, made up of a
number of substantive and operational
continued on page two
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Peace Accords
continuedfrom page one

the unjust and exclusive arrangements under which they have lived for centuries.
Second, looked at in terms of the specific
agreements, they are a very mixed bag. The
accords include very positive agreements
with great potential (e.g., the Indigenous
Peoples Accord) alongside some extremely
limited accords (e.g., the Socioeconomic
Accord) and others (such as the amnesty
provisions in the agreement on allowing
the URNG to return to civilian life) that cast
a shadow over the entire agreement. But,
third, perhaps more than anything else, they
are a work in progress. Many of the accords are framed in such broad language
that their impact will only become clear
through political struggle over their meaning and implementation.
Ending the War
The first major achievement of the accords is to have put an end to the 36-year
civil war. With even a minimal level of seriousness in the implementation of the agreements, the likelihood of a return to armed
conflict appears minimal. The Arzu government h taken steps to force out hardline and corrupt elements of the military
who might have opposed these agreements. The URNG guerrilla front has shown
itself sufficiently in control ofits members
to ensure a cease-fire since March 1996.
Any remaining "guerrilla fronts" are
likely to be more criminal than political in
nature (or attempts at destabilizing the
peace process from the right) and can be
dealt with within the normal legal processes.

If they do not, then Guatemalans will have
won the Phyrric victory_of ending a war
but still be living in an unfair, exclusive,
and conflict-ridden society.
Protection of Human Rights
The Human Rights Accord of March
1994 and the actions taken in connection
with it formed an indispensable spinal column for the entire peace process. The agree-

Historically unaccountable
sectors (normally the military)
have been unwilling to accept
peace if they may be held
liable to prosecution for
violations of human rights.
ment-the only major accord to go into
effect on signing-helped create the conditions of greater security, freedom of expression and to organize that made the
whole process appear a more viable one.
The agreement called for recognition of
basic human rights, measures to strengthen
the judicial system, and, perhaps most importantly, the deployment of a UN human
rights mission to verify the accord.
The arrival of the UN human rights verification mission (MINUGUA) with both a
human rights monitoring and institution-

Ending the war is in itself a major
achievement that should lead to increased
security and a lessening of suffering:
So, ending the war is in itself a major
achievement that should lead to increased
security and a lessening of suffering, as
well as being an essential precondition for
broader social peace, reconciliation, and
reconstruction.
Like any peace agreement, the primary
purpose is to end a conflict. Nonetheless,
it is fair to ask whether the provisions provide at least a framework for addressing
the main problems that gave rise to the war.
Page 2

five reports to date, as well as reports by
the UN independent expert on human
rights, Monica Pinto, show that politically
motivated violations of human rights continue at a very serious rate. In its most recent report (July 19, 1996), MINUGUA concluded that there had been "tangible
progress" in human rights but that "this
progress was not sufficient to bring about
substantial change in a situation characterized by grave human rights violations
and persistent impunity."
It is clear then
that if Guatemala is to
become a society
governed by the rule
of law rather than by
the reality of impunity and if the human
rights of the population are to be fully respected, the achievements made in the
last two years must be consolidated and
built upon. This will require a continuation
of the work of MINUGUA in monitoring

strengthening role, played a critical part in
building confidence that the peace process
could lead to real and lasting change. Since
its arrival in November 1994, there has been
a steep decline in politically motivated killings and other human rights abuses. Government actions against human rights violators in the military have contributed to a
climate of greater respect for human rights.
But while there has been a marked improvement in human rights, MINUGUA's
RESIST Newsletter
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and reporting on the human rights situation and in strengthening the institutions
concerned with human rights. It will also
require vigilant oversight to ensure full
implementation of the peace agreements
and international financial and technical
support to help strengthen or create viable
institutions to protect the rights of Guatemalans.

have barely functioned or have functioned
to perpetuate anti-democratic behavior and
norms. The building of new institutions
with a changed philosophy, code, and practices becomes a long-term project requiring continuing domestic commitment and
will and significant aid and support from
the international community. The accord

The Role of the Military
The· accord signed in September 1996
on Strengthening of Civil Power and the

Function ofthe Army in a Democratic Society has been viewed positively in Guatemala and internationally but, like a number
of the accords, it is more ofa promise than
a reality and will require substantial domestic and international commitment to realize its potential.
The main objectives of the accord, if
realized, would give the armed forces their
appropriate role in a democratic society as
opposed to above it and out of control.
The military would be subject to civilian
authority, separated from domestic police
functions and given the specific role of defending the country's territory and sovereignty. The commitments in the accord on
civil power and the role of the military- to
cut back on numbers and spending by a
third, and to redefine the army ' s task-reflect this changed role.
But while the current leaders of the Guatemalan armed forces appear willing to accept a new role in the future, their unwillingness to accept a thorough examination
of past violations of human rights reflects
the institution's lack of full accountability
to Guatemalan society. Although the agreement has some positive elements (the Arzu
government has taken steps to isolate hardline officers), as in many other Latin American nations making the transition from dictatorship to some form of democratic government, the military is not fully back in the
barracks and could still intervene if it feels
its interests threatened.
While there is room for some optimism
regarding the future role of the military in
Guatemalan society, the issue of strengthening civilian institutions-particularly the
judicial system- is a more problematical
one. This is not so much a problem with
the accords themselves nor a question of
political will, but an issue of the size and
scope of the problem to be resolved. In
Guatemala, the police and judicial systems
Vol. 6, #1

Peoples, signed in March 1995 is one of
the most far-reaching of all the accords in
attempting to address this most profound
question for the Guatemalan nation.
The accord incorporates many of the
positions of organizations representing the
indigenous peoples of Guatemala and has
been generally accepted by these groups
as a positive framework
within which to articulate
and advance their interests. The accord reflects
the intention to change
completely the condition
and position of indigenous people within Guatemala society-by ending discrimination; acknowledging that indigenous communities are
authors of their own cultural development; recognizing the country as
multiethnic, multilingual,
and with a plurality of cultures; and increasing the
participation and representation of i~digenous
peoples at all levels ofnational life.
The Accord on the
Identity and Rights of the
Indigenous Peoples will

require a transformation in
attitudes that have enGraffiti on a wall near Guatemala's National Palace calls
dured for centuries. This
for "No More War" in 1992. Photo by Carol Schachet
process will undoubtedly
on civil power and the role of the military is
take time. The accord, however, provides
a step in dealing with the problem- by crethe framework within which to begin the
ating a new National Civil Police, increastransformation. But for the changes envising spending on the judicial system and
aged in the accord to have more than symbolic meaning, it is essential that the soaccess to it, and creating a commission to
help remake the justice system. Butthe full
cioeconomic conditions of Guatemala's inachievement of these changes will be one
digenous peoples- 85% of whom live in
poverty-are fully addressed. Unfortuof the major challenges for Guatemala in
the coming years.
nately, this is the area where the Guatemalan peace accords are least developed.
Dealing with Exclusion and
Socioeconomic Changes in the Peace
Discrimination
A major cause of the civil conflict and a
Accords
The Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects
stain on Guatemalan society has been the
and the Agrarian Situation signed in May
discrimination , social and economic
marginalization, and political exclusion vis1996 is one of the accords that has been
most criticized by civil society sectors in
ited upon the majority of Guatemalansthe poor, women, and particularly indigGuatemala. Limited in its scope, it speaks
enous people who make up about half of
largely in the language of goals and aspirations, and fails to grasp the nettle of exthe country's population. The Accord on

the Identity and Rights of the Indigenous
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tensive poverty and inequalities that helped
give rise to the armed conflict. The accord
reflects the inequalities of power in Guatemalan society-particularly, the strength
of the business sector vis-a-vis groups representing historically disenfranchised sectors. Thus, the framework for resolving the
country's dire socioeconomic situation is
fundamentally a market-driven approachvia high rates of growth promoted through
sound macroeconomic policies. Questions
of equity and access to the market have
taken a secondary role, and agrarian reform has gone unmentioned.
The Socioeconomic Accord articulates
important aspirations, namely increased
citizen participation and a greater role for
women in socioeconomic development. It
also commits the government to significant
increases in spending on health and education. The goal of increasing by fifty percent the taxes collected promises a greater
sharing of the burden of development in
Guatemalan society, while provisions regarding land in the Socioeconomic Accord
and in the accords on Indigenous Rights
and on the Resettlement of Populations

their counterparts in Guatemala.

Revealing the Truth about the Past
The area of the Guatemalan peace accords that has already caused the greatest
difficulty and concern is the extent to which
the truth will be revealed about major human rights violations committed during the

Guatemalan negotiators failed the test. The
accord that establishes the Clarification
Commission provides that the Commission
will "not individualize responsibilities" for
violations, thereby precluding, from the
start, the whole truth being told about even
the most heinous crimes committed during
the armed conflict. The accord reflected the

Uprooted by the Armed Confrontation
(June 1994) promise to improve the economic situation of some of the communities most affected by the war.
Finally, while it is fair to say that the
Socioeconomic Accord is weak in dealing
with the profound problems of Guatemalan society, it should also be noted that in
El Salvador's 1992 peace accords the socioeconomic area was probably the weakest in the entire agreement, despite the fact
that the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas were
in a much stronger relative position than

Accessibility Grants
Resist actively seeks to fund the
additional costs of projects or events
which will make them accessible to
people with disabilities, such as sign
language interpreters or wheelchair
accessible venues. The events themselves must fit within Resist's funding priorities.
For more information and to receive
our grant guidelines, contact Resist,
One Summer Street, Somerville, MA
02143; 617/623-5110.
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A returned Guatemalan refugee stands near one of several bombs found near the newlysettled community of La Quetzal. The bombs were believed to have been dropped by the
Guatemalan army during a 1991 clash with the URNG. Photo by Piet van Lier, Impact Visuals

war. It is an issue that may become even
more contentious and affect the possibility of genuine reconciliation in Guatemala.
During the negotiations, the two parties had to face the extremely difficult moral
and political question that has been dealt
with in a number of other countries in recent years-Argentina, Chile, El Salvador,
South Africa, among others-following internal civil conflicts. On one hand, reconciliation and healing depend on the truth
being told to victims of major human rights
abuse and their families, and on some level
of justice being done. But powerful and
historically unaccountable sectors (normally the military) have been unwilling to
accept a transition to peace and democracy if they may be held liable to prosecution for violations of human rights carried
out during the conflict. What compromises,
if any, are justified to secure the end of the
conflict and the potential transition to a
more open and democratic society?
In the view of Guatemala's civil society
sectors, particularly those representing human rights victims and their families, the
RESIST Newsletter

position of the Guatemalan armed forces
which had specified that the Commission
should "not individualize those responsible
nor include sanctions of any nature."
The limitations on the role of the Clarification Commission are compounded in
the view of Guatemalan civil society
groups and international human rights organizations by the proposed amnesty
agreement contained in the Agreement for

the Basis for the Reincorporation of the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Unity into Legality signed in Madrid on
December 12, 1996. Provisions in the agreement guarantee immunity from prosecution
for members of the armed forces and those
acting under their command for unspecified common crimes carried out with "the
aim of impeding, frustrating, repressing or
sanctioning the commission of political and
related common crimes carried out by
armed opposition groups."
At the time of writing, the Arzu government had submitted a proposed amnesty
law to the Guatemalan congress that is at
best ambiguous. It purports to give amJanuary I 99 7

nesty to members of both contending
forces for political acts carried out in pursuit of the armed conflict while at the same
time saying that certain acts are
"imprescriptible" (inviolable, incapable of
being revoked), suggesting that acts such
as massacres, extra-judicial executions, and
torture would not be covered by the amnesty provisions. The problem is that the
ambiguity in the agreement and in the subsequent legislation will produce on-going,
case-by-case struggles over particular individuals and specific acts with the likelihood that few of those responsible for
grave violations will ultimately be brought
to justice. The question that is left for victims of human rights violations and their
supporters: Is peace and reconciliation
possible if there is not a satisfactory accounting of the past?
Monitoring _the Peace Process
The playing-field in Guatemala, however,
is not even, despite the positiv~ changes
in the accords. This makes it essential that
the international community- governments, financial institutions, and NGOsmake a commitment to support Guatemala's
peace process for the long haul. There are
a number of ways in which international
support will be crucial to the people of
Guatemala at this moment of transition:
*Monitoring the peace accords: The
United Nations, probably with MINUGUA
playing a central role, will be charged with
verifying compliance with the peace agreement. It is important they play a public and
vigilant role to ensure maximum compliance
with the agreements and that international
funding be conditioned upon effective
implementation of the accords.
*Ensuring community involvement in
peace and development: The Guatemalan
government is seeking over $1.5 billion to
support implementation of the accords.
Much of this funding will come from governments (mainly European) as well as the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
and the World Bank. It is essential that the
projects carried out in Guatemala to support peace and reconstruction have the
fullest possible involvement oflocal communities and base organizations in all
stages of development of the projects
which affect them. There are signs that the
international financial institutions, particularly the IDB, are willing in Guatemala to
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Thousands of refugees have returned to
Guatemala from camps in Mexico. Photo by
Sean Sprague, Impact Visuals

support innovative projects that fully involve local people in the development process. One such program, "Community Development for Peace," a $55 million program in war-torn areas of Huehuetenango
may be a model for such efforts.
*U.S. support for the peace process:
The U.S. role in Guatemala since the CIAled overthrow of the Arbenz government

in 1954 is one of the worst chapters in Cold
War history. In recent years, the U.S. has
played a more productive role in pushing
the two negotiating parties toward resolution of the conflict. In the coming period,
the U.S. can support the consolidation of
peace in Guatemala by pressing the parties
(particularly the government, to which most
of the obligations accrue) to fully carry out
the agreement. Also, increasing U.S. aid to
Guatemala-currently under $40 million
compared to about $280 million to El Salvador over three years following that country's
1992 peace agreement-can help create the
conditions for peace and reconciliation.
*Support by U.S. citizens and groups:
A wide variety of U.S. groups-human
rights, religious, solidarity, labor, and others-have played an indispensable role in
accompanying Guatemalans working for
justice, peace, and social reforms over many
years. Those in Guatemala working to
implement the accords and fulfill their promise will need even greater support in the
coming years as the possible openings for
change multiply but within a situation that
continues to be extremely difficult.

Hugh Byrne is a Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America in Washington, DC, and author ofEl Salvador's Civil
War: A Study in Revolution (Lynne
Rienner Publishers, I 996).

Confused by Postal Reclassification Regulations?
Help is Here!
If your are part of a grassroots group trying to comply with the new U.S. Postal
Service requirements, RESIST might be able to help. As of July 1, 1996, standard
(formerly "bulk") mail must be pre-sorted by ADCs (Area Distribution Centers) to
receive discounts. If you don't know what this means, it probably doesn't apply to
you. However, if you do know, we may be able to help you convert your zip code list
to ADC order if your oganization fits the following criteria:
• Non-profit social change group

· • Mail to at least 200 addresses

• Use a dBase-style database

• Use an IBM-compatible computer
(DOS or Windows)
A Resist donor has generously designed a program that creates and fills an
ADC field within your database, allowing you to order your list by ADCs. To
receive a copy of this program, please indicate if you need a 5¼ or 3 ½ disk and
send $2 to cover mailing costs to:
Resist• One Summer Street• Somerville, MA 02143.

RESIST offers no technical support with this program. However, written and
on-screen instructions are included with the program.
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GRANTS
RESIST awards grants eight times a
year to groups throughout the United
States engaged in social justice activism. This issue of the Newsletter lists
grant recipients from the December
1996 Board meeting and highlights a
f ew of those groups. For more information about these grants, contact the
organizaitons themselves at the addresses listed below.
December 1996 Grantees include:
Brandywine Peace Community (Swarthmore, PA)
Citizens Awareness Network (Shelburne
Falls, MA)
Ecumenical Program on Central America
& the Caribbean (Washington, DC)
Friends ofNitassinan (Burlington, VT)
Houston Committee for Youth and
Nonmilitary Opportunities (Bellaire, TX)
New York CISPES (New York, NY)
PFLAG-Toledo (Toledo, OH)
Pikes Peak Justice and Peace Commission
(Colorado Springs, CO)
Political Ecology Group (San Francisco,
CA)
Thread City Currency Committee
(Williamantic, CT)
Wisconsin Coordinating Council on
Nicaragua (Madison, WI)

Eastern North American
Native Forest Network
19 Church Street, Suite 7
Burlington, VT 05402
The Native Forest Network (NFN) was
founded in 1991 by activists seeking to
create a globally organized forest movement with a focus on neglected temperate
forests. NFN includes a worldwide collective of forest activists, indigenous peoples,
conservation biologists, and non-governmental organizations. The Eastern
North American Native Forest Network
(NFNENA)formed in 1993.
The Native Forest Network is working
to permanently ban the aerial herbicide
spraying of the forests of Vermont and to
bring perpetually sustainable forestry to
the region. A RESIST grant of$ I ,OOO will
_help kick off that campaign.

U.S./Guatemala Labor
Education Project
PO Box 268-290
Chicago, IL 60626
U.S./GLEPwas founded in 1987 by U.S.
trade unionists seeking to focus attention on violations of the basic rights of
Guatemalan workers. Two ofU. S./G LEP' s

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
••
Join the RESIST Pledge Program
We'd like you to consider
becoming a RESIST Pledge.
Pledges account for over
25% of our income.
By becoming a pledge. you help
guarantee RESIST a fixed and
dependable source of income on which
we can build our grant-making
program. In return, we will send you a
monthly pledge letter and reminder
along with your newsletter. We will
keep you up-to-date on the groups we
have funded and the other work being
done at RESIST.
So take the plunge and become a
RESIST Pledge! We count on you, and
the groups we fund count on us.

Yes/ I'll become a
RESIST Pledge.
I'll send you my pledge of $_ _
every month/two months/
quarter/six months (circle one).
[ ] Enclosed is an initial pledge
contribution of$___ .
[ ] I can't join the pledge program
now, but here's a contribution of
$___ to support your work.

Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Address _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City/State/Zip _ _ _ _ __
Phone _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

RESIST • One Summer Street• Somerville, MA 02143 • 617/623-Sll0

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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campaigns include the Coffee Workers
Project- which led to Starbuck' s implementing a " code of conduct" for plantations from which they purchase coffeeand the Maquila Project.
Part of the Maquila Project links North
American and Guatemalan women
workers and rights advocates in the
struggle for labor rights. A RESIST grant
of$1 ,000 supports this project.

DC Student Coalition
Against Racism
PO Box 18291
Washington, DC 20036
Formed in 1983 , the mission ofDC SCAR
has been to involve young people in
combatting racism and bigotry, including
opposing Apartheid in South Africa. In
the 1990s projects have grown to include
unlearning racism and bigotry training,
conflict resolution programs with "at
risk" youth and examining racism in the
prison industry.
DC SCAR also sponsors an organizing
internship program which trains college
and high school students to confront
racism on both local and international
levels. A RESIST grant of $1 ,000 will
support this internship program.

North Carolina
Farmworkers' Project
PO Box 352
Benson, NC 27504
The North Carolina Farmworkers' Project
was formed in 1994 by farmworker advocates who sought to create an organization controlled by migrant and seasonal
farmworkers. Since that time, NCFP has
educated farmworkers about the rights
and privileges available to them under
law; assisted workers in redressing their
grievances; provided leadership training;
conducted workshops on occupational
safety; planned cultural and educational
events; and advocated for the fair treatment of workers.
A RESIST grant of $1 ,000 will help
purchase a new copier to assist with
outreach and organizing .
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